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Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Motherhood  
Laura Oren∗ 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court has spoken more directly about what 
it means to be a father,1 than about what it means to be a mother.  It has 
considered issues relating to women’s physical and social reproductive 
roles in four major areas: comparative family relationships (unwed mothers 
versus unwed fathers), dependent mothers, mothers in the workplace, and 
the right to choose or refuse to become a mother.  In the first set of cases, 
the Court has come a long way since the 1970s toward recognizing the 
rights of unwed fathers to establish or protect family relationships, but it 
still differentiates between them and mothers.2  In this arena, the Court 
equates motherhood with automatic “caring,” in contrast to fatherhood.  As 
much as this sounds like valuing motherhood, it is simply another way to 
say that biology equals destiny.  The positive stereotypes, moreover, 
swiftly give way in the second area.3  When the Court considers dependent 
unmarried motherhood, it assumes that poor women cannot be trusted to 
care for their children properly.  Thus, all kinds of coercive and 
manipulative measures imposed on poor women in the name of public 
policy are acceptable.  In the third sphere, the Court clearly affords 
working mothers more respect today than it did before the 1970s.4           
 
∗  Laura Oren is Law Foundation Professor at the University of Houston Law Center.  
The University of Houston Law Foundation has provided financial assistance for this 
project.  Portions of this article were presented at “Twenty-first Century Motherhood: 
Change,” a conference sponsored by the University of Houston Women’s Studies Program, 
October 20-22, 2005. 
This Article is dedicated to my mother, Grace Oren, and to my spouse, Bruce Palmer, 
who has made it possible for me to care for her. 
 1.   See generally Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the 
Constitution: Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships: Biology Alone Safeguards the Public 
Fisc. 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2004).  [hereinafter Oren, Paradox]. 
 2.  See infra Part I. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
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The Court has rejected older eugenicist ideas about the “mother of the 
race” in favor of accepting women in the work place on equal terms.  This 
view, however, also has its problems.  With the exception of a case 
upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act,5 it is founded on the 
assumption that motherhood is acceptable only when it does not interfere or 
can be treated as a neutral factor in the work place.  Finally, with respect to 
the right to refuse or to choose motherhood, the Court recognized this as a 
fundamental right in 1973.6  Almost immediately thereafter, however, it 
also ruled that government need not equip women with the resources 
necessary to make the choice in good health.  That combination of rulings 
did not honor motherhood by choice.  Moreover, even the underlying 
liberty interest may be at risk today. 
Instead of offering a coherent legal analysis of these selective aspects 
of motherhood, the Court has treated them as unrelated.  Instead of 
grappling with women’s complex experience of motherhood or 
acknowledging how sex, class and race matter in this regard, the Court too 
often has reduced its analysis to simple assumptions about generic 
“Motherhood.”  Despite some positive developments and much lip service, 
the Court’s jurisprudence of motherhood fails to follow one of the 
fundamental precepts of our culture, “Honor Thy Mother.”7 
 
 5.  Nevada  Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-32 (2003) (ruling 
that state employees may receive money damages for violations of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act because it was enacted in valid reliance on Congressional power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment to ban gender-based discrimination in the workplace). 
 6.   See infra Part IV. 
 7.  The Judeo-Christian Bible provides in the Fifth Commandment, “Honor thy father 
and thy mother; that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.” 
Exodus 20:12.  In post-revolutionary times, honoring motherhood became an important 
political precept.  The ideals of “Republican Motherhood,” a term coined by historian LINDA 
KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 
(1980), meant that women played an important role in educating their sons in the civic 
virtue necessary for the survival and success of the new nation.  As a result, women’s 
education became an important issue at this time.  Thereafter, many famous Americans 
attributed their success to their mothers.  For example, the following quotation has been 
attributed to George Washington (1732-1799): “My mother was the most beautiful woman I 
ever saw.  All I am I owe to my mother.  I attribute all my success in life to the moral, 
intellectual and physical education I received from her.” – George Washington (1732-1799).  
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) echoed the sentiment: “All that I am or ever hope to be, I 
owe to my angel Mother.”  Stock Solution, Tribute to Motherhood,  
http://www.xmission.com/~tssphoto/mom/trib.html (last visited February 9, 2006). 
The celebration of Mother’s Day is the commercial apotheosis of this precept.  Anna Jarvis 
was the influence behind the version of mother’s day that we celebrate today.  (Julia Ward 
Howe previously had proposed a version dedicated to world peace.)  In 1905, Jarvis 
reputedly swore at the graveside of her mother Anna Reeves Jarvis, that she would dedicate 
herself to accomplishing her mother’s project to establish a Mother’s Day to honor mothers 
living and dead.  The ceremonies spread to virtually all the states before World War I, and 
an official day was first recognized by a congressional resolution in 1914.  Jone Johnson 
Lewis, Anna Jarvis and Mother’s Day — Mother’s Day History, http://womenshistory.about 
.com/od/mothersday/a/anna_jarvis.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006); National Women’s 
History Project, Events: The History of Mother’s Day, http://www.nwhp.org/events/moms-
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I.  UNMARRIED MOTHERS VERSUS UNWED FATHERS: 
MOTHERHOOD “IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL 
SENSE” (“CARING” PER SE?) 
With the rise of what has been called the “newer equal protection,” in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court upset some laws because of 
invidious distinctions based on the birth status of children (“illegitimacy”), 
the marital status of biological mothers or fathers, or legal differentiation 
between women and men in the treatment of non-marital families.  
Similarly, the Justices found a number of provisions touching on these 
relationships offended due process.8  Although the overwhelming majority 
of these cases concerned children and their putative fathers, there were a 
few that explicitly involved claims by unmarried mothers or their children.  
Insofar as the Justices writing the father opinions felt obliged to establish 
that unmarried parents of either gender were or were not similarly situated, 
moreover, they too reflected on “motherhood.” 
The law of “bastardy,” as it was called at English common-law, was 
harsh.  The nonmarital child was “filius nullius,” i.e., child and heir of no 
one.9  By 1900, however, the American “republican modification” of 
traditional law generally recognized a legal unit consisting of children and 
their unmarried mothers, with consequences affecting custody, support, and 
inheritance.10  Non-marital paternity, however, gave rise to only limited 
rights and responsibilities, mostly designed to protect the public purse from 
having to support children born outside of marriage.11  By 1968, when the 
Court considered two unmarried mother laws from Louisiana, the majority 
was willing to find constitutional fault with what it saw as a remaining 
anomaly in that state’s approach to “sanctions against illegitimacy.”12  In 
Levy v. Louisiana,13 five “illegitimate children” sued a doctor and insurance 
company for damages for the wrongful death14 of their mother and to 
 
day/history-of-moms-day.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). 
 8.  For discussion of many of these cases, see generally Oren, Paradox, supra note 1. 
 9.  Michael Grossberg, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 197 (1985). 
 10.  Grossberg, supra note 9, at 208-212, 224.  See also, LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF 
THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960 
102 (1988) (while illegitimacy was considered a problem, by the 1890s critics believed that 
it was best to keep mother and child together.  “This belief represented a victory for the 
sentimental cult of motherhood.”). 
 11.  Grossberg, supra note 9, at 215-217. 
 12.  Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insur. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968). 
 13.  Id. at 68. 
 14.  Wrongful death actions compensate surviving beneficiaries for the loss of their 
decedents.  Wrongful death actions did not exist at common law, but are solely the creation 
of statutes.  The dissent in Glona emphasized this distinction, and claimed that a recent 
survey of American law showed that the statutes using the word “child” or “children” 
defined those beneficiaries as legitimate children only.  Glona, 391 U.S. at 76, citing S. 
Speiser, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 587 (1966). 
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recover as her survivors for the pain and suffering she experienced.15  In a 
companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance 
Co.,16 an unmarried mother sought recovery for the wrongful death of her 
child, who was killed in an automobile accident.17  Louisiana, however, 
refused recovery under these two circumstances on the grounds of avoiding 
incentives for immorality, and punishing sin, respectively.18  In two short 
opinions, Justice Douglas dismissed this reasoning as irrational.19  Louise 
Levy  
gave birth to [the five children that sued for her death] and . . . they 
lived with her; . . . she treated them as a parent would treat any 
other child; and . . . she worked as a domestic servant to support 
them, taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling them, at 
her own expense in a parochial school.20 
The rights at issue concerned the “intimate, familial relationship 
between a child and his own mother.”21  Justice Douglas decried letting the 
wrongdoer go free because of the legal status of the children’s birth.22  He 
defended Louise Levy’s motherhood: “These children, though illegitimate, 
were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were 
indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they 
suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.”23  In Glona, the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion was the same: a biological mother is a mother, 
even where she never married the father.24  Thus “where the claimant is 
plainly the mother, the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold 
relief merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out of 
wedlock.”25 
 
 15.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 69.  Louisiana law provided that the deceased’s right to recover 
for all non-property damages he suffered survived for one year after the death and could be 
inherited and recovered by certain named survivors. 
 16.  391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 17.  Glona, 391 U.S. at 74. 
 18.  See Levy, 391 U.S. at 70; Glona, 391 U.S. at 75.  The two cases posed somewhat 
different problems, because in Levy it was the innocent child who was denied recovery, 
while in Glona, it was the “sin” of the mother that was being punished by refusing her a 
remedy. 
 19.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 71; Glona  391 U.S. at 75. 
 20.  Levy, 391 U.S. at 70. 
 21.  Id. at 71. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 72. 
 24.  Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-6. 
 25.  Id. at 76.  Compare Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979),  upholding a Social 
Security provision of “mother’s insurance benefits” for persons dependent on a wage earner 
who became widowed or divorced that excluded the mother of a non-marital child.  Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for a divided Court that there was a “rational relationship” to the 
government’s desire to ease the economic dislocation that occurs when a wage earner dies, 
forcing the surviving parent to choose between working or staying home to take care of  the 
children.  Congress could assume that this dislocation occurred in a marital, but not typically 
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By contrast to the brevity and bold assertion of irrationality in the 
majority opinions of Levy and Glona, the Court splintered in Parham v. 
Hughes,26 which involved Georgia’s wrongful death statute.  Georgia 
prohibited a father who failed to legitimate his child from recovering for 
his son’s wrongful death, while an unmarried mother was entitled to do 
so.27  The plurality, the concurring opinion, and the dissent did not even 
agree whether the pertinent classifications to be examined were based on 
gender.  Because “mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not 
similarly situated,” the plurality was convinced that the statute was not 
based on any invidious “overbroad generalizations about men as a class, 
but rather the reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral action 
legitimate an illegitimate child.”28  The classification therefore is not men 
versus women, mothers versus fathers, but “fathers who have legitimated 
their children” versus those who have not.  As a result, the plurality found 
it unnecessary to apply the heightened (intermediate) scrutiny that the 
Court had come to apply to gender-based distinctions, and consequently 
decided it was easy to uphold the law.29 
Like the dissent, concurring Justice Lewis F. Powell recognized gender 
classifications when he saw them, but unlike them, he thought that the 
statutory differences were justified because fathers of illegitimate children 
are not similarly situated to mothers.30  The identity of mothers is clear, but 
it can be difficult to establish the father of an illegitimate child: “The 
marginally greater burden placed upon fathers [to legitimate] is no more 
 
in a non-marital family.  Using a low level of scrutiny for the discrimination between 
classifications of mothers, the Court also dismissed the “incidental and speculative impact” 
on classifications of children (marital versus nonmarital).  Therefore, there was no 
discrimination against them either.  By contrast to this result, the Court had previously 
invalidated the exclusion of fathers from these benefits.  See, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636 (1975).  In that case, the Court reasoned that despite any empirical basis for 
the belief that fathers are generally wage-earners, while mothers stay at home to care for 
children, the one-sided statute constituted a prohibited generalization that violated the rights 
of women workers who received less coverage for their families.  Id. at 645.  The Court 
rejected the argument that the preference for “‘mothers” over fathers was benign and 
designed to compensate stay at home mothers for the financial difficulties they faced if they 
were forced to support their families.  Rather, the Court concluded that the congressional 
purpose was to allow a child who had lost one parent to have the benefit of the personal 
attention of the other parent, who would not be forced to go out to work.  Id. at 648-49.  
Distinguishing between mothers and fathers on that basis was wholly irrational, as each 
“parent” enjoyed the same constitutional right to the care, custody and companionship of his 
or her children.  Id. at 651-52. 
 26.  441 U.S. 347 (1979).  Justice Stewart, who dissented in Levy and Glona,  wrote 
the plurality opinion, 441 U.S. at 348.  Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, id. at 359.  
Justice White wrote for the four dissenters.  Id. at 361. 
 27.  Id. at 348-349. 
 28.  Id. at 356. 
 29.  Id. at 353-54, (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976)). 
 30.  Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
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severe than is required by the marked difference between proving paternity 
and proving maternity — a difference we have recognized repeatedly.”31  
Lemeul Parham’s father had given his son his name, signed his birth 
certificate, visited him, and contributed to his support before the child’s 
death.32  But the unmarried Mr. Parham had never taken the additional step 
available to him under Georgia law of legitimizing his son.  The father had 
it in his own hands to answer the State’s concerns about proof of paternity, 
but he failed to do so.  Thus, Justice Powell reasoned that the distinction 
between mothers and fathers satisfied the demands of a standard that 
required means that substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.33 
The dissent agreed with Justice Powell that the Georgia statute treated 
fathers differently than mothers by requiring a certain kind of proof of 
paternity from unmarried men.34  They were amazed, however, at a circular 
reasoning that justified this distinction based on still another discriminatory 
difference: fathers had to legitimate their children; mothers did not.35  None 
of the interests proffered by the State of Georgia justified the 
discrimination between mothers and fathers.  The dissent rejected any 
notion that the statute helped the State promote “a legitimate family unit” 
or set a standard of morality, as much too tenuous a connection to satisfy 
heightened scrutiny.36  Why would this be true for a rule that created 
obstacles for fathers, when unmarried mothers were not similarly 
burdened?  As to proof problems, the dissent was not convinced of their 
urgency in this context.  While the Court’s intestacy cases displayed 
sensitivity to the need to resolve quickly the claims of heirs to property and 
to settle estates, there was “no comparable interest in protecting a tortfeasor 
from having his liability litigated and determined in the usual way.”37 
Finally, the dissent objected to a stereotype that painted all unmarried 
fathers who failed to legitimate their children as “suffer[ing] no real loss 
from the child’s wrongful death.”38  Maybe it was true of “certain” of those 
parents, but this kind of blanket presumption that unmarried fathers never 
maintain as close a relationship to their children as unmarried mothers was 
unacceptable.39  The dissent reiterated the Court’s message of Caban v. 
Mohammed40 that no “broad, gender-based distinction . . . is required by 
 
 31.  Id. at 360 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268-69). 
 32.  Id. at 349. 
 33.  Id. at 360. 
 34.  Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 362-63. 
 37.  Id. at 364.  For the checkered path of the father cases, see generally Oren, 
Paradox, supra note 1. 
 38.   Parham, 441 U.S. at 366. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
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any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every 
phase of a child’s development.”41  The footnote to this statement is very 
interesting.  The dissent cites statistics reflecting that in “1977, 15.5% of all 
children and 51.7% of the black children born in the United States had 
unmarried parents.”42  It continued, “[t]he suggestion that anything 
approaching a majority of the fathers of these children would ‘suffer no 
real loss from the child’s wrongful death’ is incredible.”43  The footnote 
facts, cited without a context in this case, imply a distinct racial point: Can 
the Court accept without constitutional cavil a blanket generalization that 
denigrates the caring and attachment of so many black fathers? 
According to the Parham dissenters, the stereotypes incorporated into 
Georgia’s statutory scheme went beyond the assumptions about unmarried 
fathers.  Indeed, by state law, even for a legitimate child, the father “was 
absolutely prohibited from bringing a wrongful-death action if the mother 
is still alive, even if the mother does not desire to bring suit and even if the 
parents are separated or divorced.  The incredible presumption that fathers, 
but not mothers, of illegitimate children suffer no injury when they lose 
their children is thus only a more extreme version of the underlying and 
equally untenable presumption that fathers are less deserving of recovery 
than are mothers.”44  While the dissenters and the plurality in Parham 
debated the quality of fatherhood and what assumptions state law may 
make about it, neither had to strain to accept the quality of motherhood 
embraced in the Georgia statute: mothers cared and suffered when they lost 
their children, whether they were married to the fathers or not; the only 
question was whether fathers, or enough of them, shared this characteristic. 
I have written elsewhere about the full line of constitutional cases in 
which unmarried fathers attempted to establish or protect personal 
relationships with their children.45  Those decisions also provoked debate 
among the Justices about just how much fathers cared in comparison to 
mothers.  Were unmarried fathers really similarly situated to unmarried 
 
 41.  Parham, 441 U.S. at 367 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 380). 
 42.  Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of HEW, National Center for Health Statistics, 27 Vital 
Statistics Report, No. 11, p. 19 (1979)). 
 43.   Id. at 367, n.14. 
 44.  Id. at 368.  Wrongful death recoveries were initially limited to pecuniary loss.  
Subjected to great criticism, this restriction gave way (through legislative action and judicial 
interpretation) to the idea that the loss of companionship of a child was a compensable 
injury, just like the loss of consortium of a spouse.  For example, in 1983 the Texas 
Supreme Court ruled that a parent’s recovery under the wrongful death statute includes the 
loss of companionship and society and damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of 
the child’s wrongful death.  Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983).  The 
destruction of the parent-child relationship results in mental anguish, and it would be 
unrealistic to separate injury to the familial relationship from emotional injury.  Id.  “The 
real loss sustained by the parent . . . is the loss of love, advice, comfort, companionship, and 
society.”  Id. at 251. 
 45.  See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 50-70. 
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mothers, who could be presumed to have a truly familial relationship with 
their children by virtue of birth alone?  Or, was more required from these 
men?  The Court decided in a series of cases where mothers apparently 
wanted their husbands to adopt or otherwise legally step into the shoes of 
the child’s biological father that in order to establish constitutionally 
protected rights, unmarried fathers had to demonstrate “biology ‘plus,’” 
i.e., that they actually had some kind of developed relationship to their 
children.46  The disputes between majority and dissenting opinions in these 
cases illuminate the presumptions that the jurists themselves made about 
motherhood and fatherhood, at least of the unmarried variety.  So, for 
example, the Court quite properly decided in Stanley v. Illinois,47 that the 
State of Illinois could not presume that the unmarried father of three non-
marital children was unfit to raise them after the death of their mother, 
removing them from his legal custody without any kind of a hearing.48  He 
had “sired and raised” them for 18 years, giving rise to a clearly protected 
constitutional interest in his continued family relationships.  Mothers could 
not be treated this way, and the Court concluded that a father like Mr. 
Stanley also could not.49  However, the State of Illinois argued, and the 
dissent agreed, that unwed fathers were different than unwed mothers.  Not 
only was it easier to prove motherhood, but also mothers in general cared 
about their children, while nonmarital fathers typically did not.50  If they 
did care, they could either marry the mother, or, at the least, legitimate the 
child.51  Following a case in which a biological father failed to show that he 
had enough of a relationship to block the adoption of his child by the 
mother’s husband,52 the Court again returned to a debate about the 
differences between motherhood and fatherhood.  In Caban v. 
Mohammed,53 the majority was impressed with the quality of Mr. Caban’s 
relationship to his older non-marital children: his name was on their birth 
certificates; he had lived with them; and he continued to visit and 
contribute to their support even after his separation from their mother and 
the marriages each parent contracted with someone else.  Having “come 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child” in this fashion, Mr. Caban 
earned the perquisites of true fatherhood and could block adoption by 
another man.54 
 
 46.   Id. at 118. 
 47.   405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 48.  Id. at 649. 
 49.  Id.  at 650-58. 
 50.  Id. at 666 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Id. at 664. 
 52.  See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).  The plaintiff based his equal 
protection claim on distinctions between married and unmarried fathers, but did not raise a 
gender challenge.  Id. at 253 & 254 n.13. 
 53.   441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 54.  Id. at 392. 
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The Caban dissenters, however, insisted that unwed motherhood and 
fatherhood were different.55  Only the mother carries the child; it is she who 
has the constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not.  Moreover, 
while the mother’s identity is obvious, the father’s may never be known.  
While unwed motherhood meant having to make decisions about the 
child’s future, such as adoption, unwed fathers might float in the wind.  If 
they were allowed to intervene later, they could upset the whole scenario of 
secure newborn adoption.56 
The debate over mothers and fathers subsequently was reprised in Lehr 
v. Robertson,57 which involved a challenge to New York State’s “putative 
father registry” law.  Because he was the wrong kind of unmarried father, 
Mr. Lehr lost out.  He had failed to “demonstrat[e] a full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the 
rearing of his child,”58 and he had not even managed to send a postcard to 
the putative father registry to inform the state of his interest in his 
offspring.59  As a result, he lost the opportunity presented by his biological 
link, to ripen it into a relationship protected by the Constitution.  This was a 
Due Process, not an Equal Protection argument, but the majority also 
insisted that a reluctant unmarried father was not similarly situated with the 
unmarried mother.60  Therefore, any gender distinction was easy to justify.  
Dissenters White, Marshall, and Blackmun, however, were not convinced 
that the mere biological relationship was of such little weight, especially 
where the issue at stake was the simple right to a hearing.61 
In 2001, a divided Court once again considered the differences between 
unwed motherhood and fatherhood.  Nguyen v. INS62 was a case in which 
an American non-marital father, who had raised the now-adult child that he 
sired by a non-citizen mother, unsuccessfully challenged a gender-based 
provision of immigration law.  Children born abroad to an unmarried 
American citizen mother (and alien father) were eligible for United States 
citizenship upon simple proof of the biological relationship, without much 
more.63  Reverse the circumstances, however, and the children of 
unmarried American men faced substantially greater obstacles to derivative 
citizenship.64  In this case, the majority equated biology to destiny for both 
 
 55.  Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 56.  Id. at 404-05. 
 57.   Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 58.  Id. at 261. 
 59.  Id. at 251. 
 60.  Id. at 267-68. 
 61.  Id. at 271 (White, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 63.  8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1988) (there was also a residency requirement for the citizen 
parent  8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), incorporating by reference, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)). 
 64.  8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (the unmarried citizen father had to demonstrate proof of the 
biological relationship by clear and convincing evidence and, inter alia, that he agreed in 
writing to support the child until the age of 18; and that before the child reached 18, he did 
OREN - FOR CHRISTENSEN 4/12/2006  9:46 AM 
196 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17.2  
mothers and fathers.  Congress was allowed to differentiate based on the 
“incontrovertible” fact that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated.65  
While the majority held that a woman who gives birth to a child is clearly 
her biological mother, they ruled that even in this day of DNA testing, the 
proof of paternity is less secure. 66 
The second “important governmental interest” the Court said was 
furthered by the statute is even more telling about the Nguyen majority’s 
view of the differences between unwed motherhood and fatherhood.  The 
Court insisted that Congress recognized that the “opportunity for a 
meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the 
very event of birth.  The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers 
and has an initial point of contact with him.  There is at least an opportunity 
for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship.”67  
Unmarried citizen fathers, however, who may be stationed around the 
world spreading their progeny with little regard for the consequences, lack 
this birth-given opportunity.68  As a result, even though in the case before 
the Court there was an absent alien mother and an American father with a 
developed relationship to his child,69 opportunity apparently could trump 
reality.  Rather than relying on forbidden generalizations or stereotypes, the 
majority held that Congress permissibly constructed its scheme with the 
“enduring physical differences” between women and men (mothers and 
fathers) in mind.70 
The Court’s use of an important decision written by Justice Ginsburg to 
trumpet its point about the physical differences between men and women, 
however, is misleading, and very disturbing from the point of view of 
feminist jurisprudence.  Immediately after the quoted words, the Virginia 
Military Institute v. U.S. (“VMI”)71opinion continues.  Justice Ginsburg 
 
one of several things to legally establish his paternity or to legitimate the child.  Joseph 
Boulais, the father in the Nyguen case had in fact brought his young son back from Vietnam 
and raised him.  He did not recognize the importance of taking the additional formal steps 
until efforts were made to deport his 22-year-old son, who had been convicted of serious 
criminal offenses.  The father’s subsequent proof of biological paternity and adjudication in 
a Texas court was rejected for citizenship purposes as occurring too late under the statutory 
scheme); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
 65.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63. 
 66.  Id. at 54. 
 67.  Id. at 65. 
 68.  Id. at 64-65. 
 69.  Id. at 57 (Joseph Boulais was a civilian employee in Vietnam who fathered a son 
out of wedlock with a Vietnamese woman in 1969.  After his relationship with the mother 
ended, the family of the father’s new girlfriend cared for the boy, until his father brought 
him to Texas at the age of 6, thereafter raising him to adulthood). 
 70.  Id. at 68 (citing Virginia Military Institute v. U.S. (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996)). 
 71.  U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia’s male-only military 
and leadership academy, coupled with a female only institution that lacked comparable 
prestige and resources, violated the equal protection of the laws). 
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explained: “‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come 
to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the 
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s 
opportunity.  Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for 
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ . . . to ‘promot[e] 
equal employment opportunity,’. . . to advance full development of the 
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.”  The Nguyen biology-is-
destiny holding, however, fits none of these categories.  It is ironic, and 
perhaps dangerous, that the Court uses VMI, a case with one of the 
strongest rulings against gender bias, to justify the Nguyen result with its 
tepid application of intermediate scrutiny.  This is not good for women in 
any sense.  By reducing parentage to the opportunity to be present at birth, 
the Court denies respect to a man who was a true father to his son, but it 
also limits the sphere of motherhood as well (to mere presence at birth). 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen reminded the 
majority that laws were to be examined quite closely for invidious 
“overbroad sex-based classifications.”72  Hypothetical government 
purposes loosely connected to such categories do not pass muster under 
gender-based Equal Protection jurisprudence.  Thus, the dissent found it 
easy to dismiss the first purported goal of the statute — ensuring the 
existence of a biological relationship.73  While mothers suffered no extra 
burdens in proving the biological relationship, even with the help of 
modern DNA testing fathers faced insurmountable obstacles if they failed 
to make their proof before the child turned age 18 and in the prescribed 
manner.74 
The dissent’s second criticism is even more persuasive: How can the 
mere “opportunity” to develop a parent-child relationship be more 
important than the reality?75  Even if opportunity counts, Congress could 
choose a sex-neutral alternative that required that a parent be present at 
birth or have knowledge of the birth.76  Instead, it adopted a rule that only 
crudely fit the means to the purported ends, something that may be 
acceptable in ordinary constitutional review, but which is banned when a 
classification meriting heightened scrutiny, such as gender, is at issue.  
Stereotypes, not physical differences between men and women, underlay 
the statute and therefore the dissent would find it invalid.77  The dissenting 
Justices were unconvinced that the sex-based difference in the law 
“substantially relate[d] to the achievement of the goal of a ‘real, practical 
 
 72.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Souter, and Breyer). 
 73.  Id. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 74.  Id. at 80. 
 75.  Id. at 84. 
 76.  Id. at 86. 
 77.  Id. at 87. 
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relationship’” between citizen parent and child.78  Instead, they saw a 
stereotype in action — “the generalization that mothers are significantly 
more likely than fathers. . . to develop caring relationships with their 
children.”79  This sentiment brings us back to the heart of the debate over 
unmarried motherhood versus unwed fatherhood: are mothers parents in the 
“biological and in the spiritual sense,” while fathers who do not marry the 
mothers or timely legitimate their children are different? 
Unwed fatherhood is problematic for the Court, provoking sharp 
dissent, and even some comments that suggest fatherhood is not the same 
in all communities or cultures.  On the other hand, it seems that the Court 
equates giving birth, to motherhood, to a per se caring relationship with 
those biological children.  In other words, biological motherhood is 
motherhood in the spiritual sense.  One should not assume however, that 
this essentialist view of motherhood (“mothers are caring”)80 means that the 
Court honors mothers in a deeper sense that would provide social support 
for mothers in this society.  The next set of decisions amply illustrates how 
apparently beneficent assumptions about motherhood can take a nasty turn 
in a different context, where the mothers in question are dependent, 
unmarried, and perhaps women of color. 
II.  DEPENDENT UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD 
Based on various state and local “Mother’s Aid” program models,81 the 
1935 federal enactment of “Aid to Dependent Children” (later “Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children” or “AFDC”) was gendered from its 
conception.82  It was designed to facilitate “the care of dependent children 
in their own home.”83  In other words, at the outset, the federal program 
 
 78.  Id. at 88-89. 
 79.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89 (the dissent condemned this generalization even where 
there was some empirical evidence in support, and it was not disrespectful to women as a 
class). 
 80.  Any criticism of the essentialist view that mothers are automatically caring, is not 
meant to deny the empirical fact that mothers do most of the “caring” work in society at 
present, whether unpaid for children and the elderly, or in the paid labor market in the health 
services industries.  See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD; WHY THE 
MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 7 (2002) (citing economist 
SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN (1997) on caring for 
children and, increasingly, for the elderly). 
 81.  Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions From 
Welfare ‘Reform,’ Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 733 n.236 (1998). 
 82.  GORDON, supra note 10, at 105-107.  Although Boston’s Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established by middle-class progressive reformers 
and reflected their agenda, by 1920, even those social workers had come to support 
“mothers’ pensions.”  Their embrace of this policy was driven in significant part by client 
demand from single or deserted women who needed to support their children and wanted to 
keep their families intact.  Gordon also argues that the reformers’ gender assumptions and 
desire to hold men responsible and to preserve filial ties, were in tension with the mothers’ 
pension benefit.  Nonetheless, that reform caught on anyway.  Id. at 104. 
 83.  Murphy, supra note 81, at 733 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964)). 
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apparently acknowledged the value of caring stay-at-home mothers.84  
AFDC became the chief form of assistance to mothers and their children 
who were dependent on public largesse.85  The 1960s, however, saw a 
sharp rise in the welfare rolls, provocatively and inaccurately blamed by 
some on alleged deficiencies in the “Negro family.”86  Critics have 
described a progression of work requirements imposed on dependent 
mothers that reflected notions about what is appropriate work for what kind 
of mother.  Black mothers in the South were expected to work as domestics 
or farmhands in the 1960s.  By the end of the decade, various kinds of 
incentives to enter the workforce were built into AFDC for dependent 
mothers, sometimes requiring participation in job training programs.  In the 
early 1970s, the government required mothers of school-age children to 
register for work and training in order to be eligible to receive benefits.  
The 1988 Family Support Act also added mothers of 3-year-olds to the 
work requirement.  Finally, when AFDC was replaced by Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in the PRWORA in 1996, the work 
expectations became universal.  That “reform” imposed maximum periods 
for receipt of benefits before turning mothers of children out into the work 
force along with everyone else. 87 
As a consequence of the fall-out from the increases in assistance rolls, 
along with other economic, social, and political developments, the public 
policy of dependency began to impose greater restrictions and personal 
indignities on the mothers and children on welfare.88  Some states imposed 
“substitute father”89 and stepfather and “male person assuming the role of 
spouse” even though not legally married to the mother (“MARS”)90 
 
 84.  Murphy, supra note 81, at 733.  It is not clear, however, that the payments were 
seen as compensation for labor beneficial to society, i.e., the raising and caring for children.  
See, e.g., Linda Gordon, supra note 10, at 107 (noting that nineteenth century preference to 
institutionalize children rather than aid the mother to keep them, meant that most of the 
children in institutions were only “half-orphans,” with mothers who might have been able to 
care for them with assistance).  For the history of mothers’ pension welfare programs, see 
King, v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1968) (citing J. Brown, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, at 
26-32 (1940)). 
 85.  Murphy, supra note 81, at 733 & 732, n.235 (noting that “[w]omen — typically 
mothers who are divorced or separated from, or have never been married to, the fathers of 
their children — represent almost all of the adult Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”) recipients in this country.”) (citing Jeffrey Lehman & Sheldon Danziger, 
“Ending Welfare, Leaving the Poor to Face New Risk, Forum Applied Res. & Pub. Pol’y 
Winter 1997, at 43-44 n.4 (Of the 4.8 million families that received AFDC benefits in a 
typical month in fy 1993, almost 90 percent were fatherless)). 
 86.  See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 94-95 (citing Frances Fox Piven & Richard 
A. Cloward, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 198 (2d ed. 
1993)). 
 87.  Murphy, supra note 81, at 735-36. 
 88.  Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 96-97; Murphy, supra note 81, at 733-34. 
 89.  See  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968) (invalidating these regulations on a 
statutory basis in the final days of the Warren Court). 
 90.  See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 553 (1970) (invalidating MARS regulations 
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regulations that denied benefits to children where the mother “cohabited” 
with, or lived together with a man in a spouse-type relationship, even if he 
was not a “parent” with an obligation of support to those children. 91  Some 
states staged unannounced home “visits,” and terminated benefits to 
mothers who refused them.92  The Social Security Amendments of 1974, 
moreover, directed all states to demand that mothers receiving AFDC 
cooperate in establishing the identity of the fathers of their children.93  The 
enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 required states to achieve the 
establishment of paternity in a certain number of AFDC cases, and 
subsidized those efforts with federal funds.94  The 1984 Deficit Reduction 
Act (“DFRA”) imposed “deemed income” rules that treated a household as 
a single filing unit, regardless of the fact that the fathers of some of the 
children included were supporting them independently.95  In 1996, these 
developments culminated in a thorough-going overhaul which abolished 
AFDC in favor of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (or “TANF”), 
premised on the notion of a time limit for assistance, after which virtually 
all family heads, including single mothers, would be expected to move into 
the private workforce.96 
Commentators have debated whether the replacement of AFDC by 
TANF represented a departure from the view of motherhood as valuable 
that was allegedly once recognized by public policy; or was merely the 
apotheosis of long-term attitudes toward the “deviance” of single and 
dependent mothers.97  For their part, after the Warren Court gave way to 
the Burger Court, the Justices generally deferred to these policies with their 
 
as a matter of statutory interpretation). 
 91.  King, 392 U.S. at 313-14 (by Alabama law a “substitute father” included any 
man who lived in the mother’s home or visited it frequently in order to have sex with her, or 
had sex with her elsewhere, whether or not the children were his or he had any obligation of 
support to them). 
 92.  See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 310 (1971) (upholding New York State’s 
unannounced visits). 
 93.  See Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 
(1975); S. REP. NO. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8154-55 
(cooperation requirement for AFDC).  Cf. 45 CFR § 232.12(b), 233.10(a)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 608(a)(2), (requirement of cooperation for Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 1396k. (Cooperation 
requirement for Food Stamps).  But see 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (waiver of cooperation 
requirement for good cause); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (good cause waiver of 
cooperation requirement in domestic violence situations). 
 94.  See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2348-50 
(1988). 
 95.  Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494; 89 Stat. 1145; amended Section 
402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed. Supp. III). 
 96.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000)).  
See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 97-98. 
 97.  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 81, at 735-36 (noting the debate between Carol 
Sanger, who finds a policy shift that devalued mothers; and Martha Minow, who thinks that 
the latest changes marked no real departure from a class and race-ridden view of the 
“deviance” of unmarried mothers). 
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rigid and coercive views of proper family relationships.  For example, 
federal law provided that a state agency that had “reason to believe that the 
home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for the 
child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child . . . shall 
bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law 
enforcement agencies in the State.”98  Unobjectionable as this concern for 
children is, New York State chose to implement it through periodic, 
unannounced, and warrantless home visits.99  Benefits were terminated if a 
recipient refused these conditions.100  If viewed as an ordinary “search,” 
these visits invaded the very core of privacy in the home protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.101  However, the majority of the Court found them not 
to be  “searches” in the usual meaning of the term, and  “reasonable” in any 
case.102  The Court argued that any “rights” claimed by the mother had to 
yield to the “needs” of the child.103  Moreover, this was a question of public 
money, where the State has a “paramount” interest in seeing that it is spent 
as intended.104  The Court even cast aspersions on the woman who 
challenged the State in the case before them. 
“The record is revealing as to Mrs. James’ failure ever really to 
satisfy the requirements for eligibility; as to constant and repeated 
demands; as to attitude towards the caseworkers; as to reluctance to 
cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency.  
There are indications that all was not always well with the infant 
Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite).  The 
picture is a sad and unhappy one.”105 
At the same time, it insisted, even in the face of disturbing information 
about qualifications, that the caseworker “is not a sleuth but rather, we trust 
is a friend to one in need.”106   
 
 98.  Wyman, 400 U.S. at 315, (citing Section 402, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1964 ed. Supp. 
V)) (In addition, if a state had reason to think that the payments of aid were not being used 
in the best interests of the child, it could counsel the recipient, and, in the absence of 
improvement, seek appointment of a guardian, protective payments, or imposition of civil or 
criminal penalties). 
 99.  Id. at 319-20. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See id. at 327-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 102.  Id. at 317 (finding it consistent with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967) and City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) in which divided Courts found that 
administrative inspections by city housing inspector for violation of building’s occupancy 
permit; and a fire department’s fire code inspection, respectively, required a warrant). 
 103.  Id. at 318. 
 104.  Id. at 319. 
 105.  Id. at 322, n.9 (this tainting of Mrs. James occurred without any indication that 
her treatment of her child had been of concern to the state through an abuse and neglect 
action). 
 106.  Id. at 323, n.11 (the Court maintained this optimistic slant on the role of the 
caseworker in the face of a grim amicus brief from AFSCME, the union bargaining for the 
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 In this beneficent world, in which any possible criminal prosecution 
would be merely a fortuitous by-product, “the warrant argument is out of 
place.”107  The “only consequence” of refusal to countenance the home 
invasion by an untrained social worker was that “payment of benefits 
ceases.”108  This apparently was just too bad in light of the administrative 
needs of the program.109 
Justice Marshall dissented pointedly.  He found it odd that caseworkers 
needed no warrant to enter the homes of poor mothers, and while there to 
look for evidence of welfare fraud or child abuse, although they clearly 
could not do this across the board.  “Yes, abuse and exploitation of children 
is terrible, but why only in poor homes – why not go into all American 
homes? . . . Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional 
law that a mother, merely because she poor, is substantially more likely to 
injure or exploit children?  Such a categorical approach to an entire class of 
citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our democracy.”110 
The visitation regulations cut deeply into the dependent mother’s 
control over the privacy of her home.  The Court later found it similarly 
easy to approve AFDC regulations that cut as deeply into the organization 
of the personal relationships of her family.111  The 1984 Deficit Reduction 
Act (DRA) required states to “take into account, with certain specified 
exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, and sisters living in the 
same home” for purposes of eligibility for benefits.112  This meant that a 
woman who had some children whose fathers supported them, and some 
whose fathers did not, had to treat them all as a family unit in her 
 
caseworkers, that noted that they were often badly trained or untrained, young and 
inexperienced.  “Despite this astonishing description by the union of the lack of 
qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must assume 
that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty”). 
 107.  Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324.  By contrast, the Court recently rejected the so-called 
“special needs doctrine” for administrative searches in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 637 (2001).  Charleston’s plan for reporting to the police the drug test results of 
pregnant women who came for help to the public hospital came under fire and was struck 
down by the Supreme Court.  See generally, Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the 
Constitution: Ruminations About Pregnant Addicted Women After Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299 (2002). 
 108.  Id. at 325. 
 109.   Id. at 326. 
 110.  Id. at 338-40, 341-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall characterized 
the social workers as sleuths, as well as case managers, who were required to report 
evidence of the felonies of welfare fraud and child abuse.  Justice Marshall was unimpressed 
by the rehabilitative and helpful posture of the home invasion: “[a] paternalistic notion that a 
complaining citizen’s constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow 
helping him is alien to our Nation’s philosophy.”) (citing Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438, 
479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard 
to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.”)). 
 111.  See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987). 
 112.  Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494; 98 Stat. 1145; amended Section 
402(a)(38) of the SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed., Supp. III). 
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application for assistance.  The income the supporting father provided for 
his child was then counted against the needs of all.  This was enforced even 
if it meant a net loss of income to the whole family, or that the child with 
an active father was penalized financially or emotionally.  One of the 
plaintiff mothers in Bowen v. Gilliard testified that her child’s father was so 
upset about his son being forced onto welfare that he ceased making 
support payments voluntarily, and even stopped coming around to see his 
son.113 
The Court announced that, like evaluation of other parts of the Social 
Security Act, its review must be “deferential.”114  Be that as it may, 
however, it is hard to miss the satisfied tone in the Court’s review of 
welfare policy.  The deference afforded to congressional efforts to save 
“huge sums of money meant” that the regulation only had to be “rational” 
to be upheld by the Court.115  In light of the contention that the regulations 
intruded onto constitutionally protected family relationships,116 however, 
the Court engaged in a rather longer explanation of current policy, with its 
clever money-saving features.  The State was paying the costs; there was 
nothing wrong with its trying to recoup some of them through assignment 
of child support claims against fathers; and, happily, millions of these 
orders, to the tune of saving $6.8 billion dollars had been established and 
enforced.117 
Once again, the dissent had a very different take: Justices Brennan and 
Marshall noted the changing demographics of an American society in 
which the percentage of households headed by a single parent increased 
twofold from 1970 to 1984, to 26 percent.118  For black families, this figure 
approached 60 percent.119  “Almost 90 percent of single-parent households 
are headed by women,”120 often living under difficult economic 
circumstances.  The dissent argued that in their precarious lives, these 
children had as much of an interest in maintaining contact with their 
 
 113.  The child frequently asked why his father did not see him anymore; he wet his 
bed; and was more disruptive and less successful in school.  Bowen, 483 U.S. at 621-22 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 114.  Bowen, 483 U.S. at 598.  See also, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-
85 (“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.”).  
Deferential review, however, yields where the classification involved merits heightened 
scrutiny, such as in explicitly gendered provisions of the SSA.  See, e.g., Weinberger, 420 
U.S. at 636 (“Mother’s” insurance benefits, that excluded fathers whose insured wives’ died 
leaving them to care for children alone, violated equal protection). 
 115.  Id. at 598. 
 116.  Id. at 601. 
 117.  Id. at 603. 
 118.  Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Current Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 
1984, p. 1 (1985) (Current Population Reports)). 
 119.  Id. at n.5. 
 120.  Id. at 613. 
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fathers, as with the mothers with whom they lived.121  If the relationship 
with the mother was nurtured by every day care and contact, the “bond” to 
the father was also sustained through his ability to support his child.122  
Thus, the dissenters were concerned about the adverse effects on the father-
child relationship of the income-deeming rules, as illustrated by Sherrod’s 
father’s reaction.  The only viable economic alternative for the boy would 
have been to move out of his mother’s household.  He was between a rock 
and a hard place – the child could either have his mother’s custodial care or 
his father’s economic support, but not both.123 
It is impossible to separate the Court’s view of poor motherhood from 
its attitude toward poverty in general (or the “right” to social services, or 
rather, lack thereof).124  Although there have been a handful of cases that 
suggested that under certain circumstances indigency is a disfavored 
classification meriting a closer look from the Court,125 the prevailing 
principle is that poverty gets no special treatment.126  Equal Protection 
jurisprudence, moreover, generally does not consider the disparate impact 
on a group of people.  Only intentional differential treatment violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment,127 so it does not matter constitutionally that 90% 
of all single parents are mothers; or that black families may be 
disproportionately affected by government regulations.  When evaluating 
the Court’s views on dependent unmarried motherhood, however, those 
facts seem quite salient indeed.  As discussed in Part I of this Article, the 
Court seemingly made some assumptions about mothers versus fathers: 
even unmarried mothers are caring, but unwed fathers may not meet that 
standard.  In these AFDC cases, however, motherhood comes under 
suspicion itself.  The dependent mother (who is poor and perhaps not so 
coincidentally may be black) cannot be trusted to be autonomously caring.  
Therefore, she is subject to manipulation by the State, which may drop in 
on the privacy of her home at any time to make sure she is not wasting 
money or abusing her children.  She also cannot choose how to organize 
 
 121.  Id. at 614-15. 
 122.  Bowen, 483 U.S. at 617. 
 123.  Id. at 626. 
 124.  See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 
(1989) (child known to be in danger had no constitutional right to protective services); 
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) (woman with state-
granted protective order has no procedural due process right to its enforcement). 
 125.  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state cannot prevent access to 
courts for a divorce due to indigency); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (state’s 
double bond requirement for tenant actions violates Equal Protection); Little v. Streater, 452 
U.S. 1 (1982) (state must pay for blood tests necessary for indigent man to disprove his 
paternity); MLB v. SLJ, 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (state must pay for trial transcripts necessary 
for indigent woman to appeal termination of her parental rights). 
 126.  See, e.g., San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 24 (1973) (holding that 
educational differences due to disparities in school district wealth does not violate the Equal 
Protection clause). 
 127.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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her household: if she wants to live with all of her children, she has to suffer 
a loss of resources to support them.  She cannot frame her relationships 
with the men who fathered her children.  She has to “cooperate” in 
identifying and suing them, and she cannot have a separate agreement with 
a supportive father of one of them.  The insult is offered to the poor men 
and children, as much as to the women in this scenario.  Nonetheless, it 
tells us something uncomfortable about the “motherhood” of dependent 
single women. 
III.  MOTHERHOOD AND WORKING WOMEN 
At first blush, the United States Supreme Court appears to have made 
giant progressive strides in its attitudes in the next set of cases, i.e., those 
about working mothers.  There is no question that compared to the 
dependent unmarried mother, the working mother has garnered more words 
of praise and respect in the Court’s opinions, especially since the mid-
1970s.  However, even from this angle, there are some ironic limits –   
motherhood seems to be honored primarily by neutralizing its 
significance.128 
The Court clearly began with gendered notions of women in the work 
place, most famously expressed in Muller v. The State of Oregon,129 which 
upheld a maximum 10-hour working day for women in 1908.  This case, 
together with Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.,130 (which involved a minimum 
wage statute), arose out of the important campaign by “social feminists” at 
the turn of the nineteenth century to gain approval for protective labor 
legislation for women.131  These cases were litigated in a judicial 
environment that was hostile to any kind of intrusion on so-called “liberty 
of contract” between employers and employees.132  Reformers in the 
 
 128.  Contemporary analysts identify motherhood as responsible for most of the wage 
gap between working women and working men.  See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 80, at 
88, 94-98 (2002) (discussing reduced earnings of mothers or “mommy tax”).  It is only 
those working women who are more like a man, i.e., without child-caring responsibilities in 
their early working careers, whose earnings closely approach those of men’s.  Id. at 87 
(women between the ages of 27 and 33 who have never had children make up the narrow 
slice of women in the work force whose wages constitute 98 cents to a man’s dollar).  
Studies have been done for educated women who seemingly have the most potential income 
to lose from the “mommy tax.”  Id. at 96.  However, “working-class women are also heavily 
penalized for job interruptions, although these are the very women who allegedly ‘choose’ 
less demanding occupations that enable them to move in and out of the job market without 
undue wage penalties.”  Id. 
 129.  208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 130.   261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 131.  See Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse, 1908-1923, 2 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM  131 (1989); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE 
NATION’S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900 (1995); ALICE 
KESSLER-HARRIS; OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 186-87 (1982). 
 132.  See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down limits to 
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National Women’s Trade Union League, the General Federal of Women’s 
Clubs, and especially, the National Consumers’ League (NCL), believed 
that gender-specific protective labor legislation was justified to improve the 
lot of women in the workforce, but also for the inroads it made for all 
workers on the rigid philosophy of laissez-faire.  The NCL developed the 
strategy behind the extensive brief co-written by Josephine Goldmarck and 
her brother-in-law Louis Brandeis (later to be on the Supreme Court).  In 
this first-ever “Brandeis brief,” the authors asked the Court to take judicial 
notice of the social science studies and facts they cited.133  The reformers of 
the 1920s shared a vision of “industrial equality” between women and men, 
to be achieved by recognizing and valuing difference, as exemplified by 
Molly Dewson’s brief in Adkins, that their male lawyers, including 
Brandeis, did not understand fully, and that the Court misused to justify 
approving inequality.134  The social feminists understood the complexities 
of the causes of women’s inferior position in the market place.135 
The Court, however, did not share the social feminist vision.  Although 
the NCL briefs asked the Court to take account of the physical and social 
differences between men and women in the workforce, the form that the 
acknowledgement took in Justice Brewer’s opinion in Muller was a far cry 
from the intent of the reformers.  Instead, he proclaimed that women’s 
physical structure and maternal functions meant that they must be treated 
differently because of the “inherent” differences ordained by nature and by 
 
bakery workers’ hours because such legislation is arbitrary interference with “the right and 
liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor”).  Before he ascended to the 
Court, Felix Frankfurter explained how Muller was significant because it started the judicial 
progress from “empty theorizing about liberty of contract to realism” in constitutional law.  
See Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 
353 (1916). 
 133.  Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
 134.  See Lipschultz, supra note 131. 
 135.  For example, Alice Hamilton, who was the first occupational physician in the 
United States, had studied lead poisoning in women who worked in the New Jersey and 
Ohio potteries.  She found that although the New Jersey women seemed worse off than men 
who worked with lead, this was not true in Ohio.  She attributed this to the difference in the 
economic and social position of women in the two states.  In New Jersey, the men were 
unionized, but the women were not.  Female potteries workers were poor and 
disadvantaged.  In the Ohio tile works and potteries, by contrast, both sexes were organized 
and the rate of lead poisoning was actually slightly higher in men.  This seemed to 
substantiate the German view that female susceptibility was not due to their sex but to being 
poorer and having to perform double duty at the workplace and at home.  As a result of 
these studies, Alice Hamilton supported gender – specific protective legislation.  She was 
associated with the NCL campaign and she also opposed passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) for many years because she feared it would jeopardize protective 
legislation.  Finally, in 1942 , after other progressive social legislation had created safety 
and health rules for all workers, she wrote to the New York Times to withdraw her 
opposition to the ERA.  See Vilma Hunt, Overview in Reproductive Health Policies in the 
Workplace, Proceedings of Symposium Held on May 10 and 11, 1982 in Pittsburg, PA.7-11, 
Seabrook, Enny C. & David K. Parkinson eds., (1983). 
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God.136  Thus, even if they could do nothing for men, legislatures could act 
to protect women, who were the “mother[s] of the race.”137 
The limits of the Court’s view of the special needs of working mothers 
quickly became clear in the next part of the social feminist campaign.  In 
Adkins, the campaign sought to defend minimum wage legislation for 
women.  The Court,138 however, denied that Muller controlled, because 
“the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical . . . has 
continued ‘with diminishing intensity’” in the wake of “revolutionary” 
changes in the “contractual, political, and civil status of women, 
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment.”139  Therefore, liberty of 
contract applied and women still had to make their own wage bargain with 
their employers.  Even though by 1923, “liberty of contract” actually was 
on its way out as a constitutional doctrine,140 the justifications for gender-
based distinctions in the law that were re-entrenched by Muller 
unfortunately persisted until the 1970s.141  The campaign for protection 
divided feminists: the social feminists and their labor allies versus radical 
feminists like Alice Paul and her National Women’s Party, who supported 
a platform of “equal treatment” across the board, and the passage of a 
national Equal Rights Amendment.142  Even today scholars and activists 
continue to debate the wisdom of the special treatment argument of the 
Brandeis brief in Muller.143 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the “second wave” of feminism stirred debates 
about new issues such as abortion and domestic violence, but also about 
correct strategies.144  Moreover, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 136.  Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Louis Brandeis was on the Court by this time, but took no part in the decision.  
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, J., dissenting), 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 139.  Id. at 552-53. 
 140.  In 1937, the Court overruled the specific holding in Adkins.  See West Coast 
Hotel Co v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  By 1941, it was clear that general labor law 
regulation was constitutionally acceptable.  See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) 
(upholding The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)). 
 141.  See Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The 
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 
871, 893 (1971) (listing the many gendered laws still in existence in 1971). 
 142.  See KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, supra note 131, at 206-12.  Even as late 
as 1968, women from the progressive United Auto Workers’ Women’s Bureau who were 
among the founding members of N.O.W. were forced to withdraw temporarily, until the 
union could be persuaded to end its opposition to the ERA.  SARA EVANS, BORN FOR 
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 230, 257-58, 277-78 (1989). 
 143.  See, e.g., Nancy S. Erikson, Muller v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a 
Sex-Based Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30 LAB. HIST. 228 (1989); Mary Becker, From 
Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1219-25 (1986); 
Lipschultz, supra note 131. 
 144.  See EVANS, supra note 142, at 274-84.  Two groups of largely middle-class 
women were both inspired by the civil rights movement.  There were the more established 
and moderate professional women who founded the National Organization for Women 
(N.O.W.) and the younger group of radical activists in the “women’s liberation” movement, 
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1964, and more effective enforcement of Title VII in the 1970s,145 plus the 
development of an “intermediate” heightened standard of constitutional 
review for classifications based on gender,146 provided a brand-new context 
for motherhood in the workplace.  The new context for working mothers 
created by these legal changes, with some significant exceptions, aspires 
toward evenhanded or neutral treatment, rather than the type of “industrial 
equality” propounded by some of the social feminists.  It remains to be 
seen, however, whether this view is all gain and no pain.  The decisions 
revolve around issues of pregnancy and maternity leave, exposure of fertile 
women to dangerous substances in the workplace, and equal benefits 
earned by working women. 
The first two cases that required neutral treatment of working mothers 
were a Title VII employment discrimination, and a constitutional case, 
respectively.  In Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,147 the company had a 
policy of refusing work applications from women with pre-school age 
children.148  The workforce was predominantly female, so this was an 
instance of what has been called “sex-plus” discrimination.149  Although the 
brief per curiam opinion of the Court seemed to suggest that if the 
employer could show that “conflicting family responsibilities were more 
relevant for a woman than for a man,” it might be able to meet the defense 
of a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) under the statute,150 
Justice Marshall’s concurrence was having none of that: “When 
performance characteristics of an individual are involved, even when 
parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may be limited only 
be employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.”151  
Phillips clearly came out the right way.  It would have been devastating to 
the early interpretations of Title VII if employers were allowed to make 
assumptions about women with children and use them to deny them 
employment on an equal basis with men.  This would be no different than 
all the years of so-called protective labor legislation that protected women 
 
who cut their political teeth on the civil rights and anti-war movements. 
 145.  See Laura Oren, Protection, Patriarchy, and Capitalism: The Politics and 
Theory of Gender-Specific Regulation in the Workplace, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 342-
43 nn.114-17 [hereinafter Oren, Protection]. 
 146.  See Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (holding that preference of male administrator over 
similarly situated female administratrix does not have a rational basis); Frontiero, 411 U.S. 
677 (plurality would have adopted strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications); Craig, 
429 U.S. 190 (Court adopted intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for 
gender-based classifications). 
 147.  Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 148.  Id. at 543.  Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (airline 
had policy of grounding all flight attendants who became mothers, but not fathers). 
 149.  Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166, 1171 (1971). 
 150.  Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. 
 151.  Id. at 545 (Marshall, J. concurring). 
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right out of their jobs.152  On the other hand, the impact of women’s greater 
responsibilities for child and elder care remains significant even today153 
and pure neutrality does not provide the solution to the larger problem. 
Pregnancy raises particularly troublesome challenges, for which 
neutrality is a necessary, but partial, answer.  The Cleveland Board of 
Education had a policy of compulsory unpaid leave for all female teachers, 
starting with their fourth month of pregnancy.154  In addition, mothers 
could not return to work until the beginning of the regular school semester 
after their infants turned 3 months old.155  Even then, the mothers had to 
show a doctor’s certificate of fitness to work, and there was no guarantee 
that their job had been held for them in the meantime.156  The Court was 
hard pressed to see any rationality in the presumptions about physical 
capacity behind these particular time-lines.157  Instead, it held that the 
overbroad rules “employ[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly 
penalize a female teacher for deciding to bear a child.”158  This is not 
exactly a principle of neutrality.  Only women, after all, have to combine 
pregnancy with work.  Nor did the Court argue that different treatment on 
the grounds of pregnancy was “sex discrimination,” a significant omission 
in light of later cases.159 
In two subsequent cases, the Court evinced its strange belief that 
pregnancy-related rules generally have nothing to do with sex 
discrimination.  California’s disability insurance program exempted from 
coverage work losses resulting from pregnancy.160  The Court had no 
difficulty distinguishing this kind of rule from those subjected to a higher 
standard of review in the gender-based equal protection cases.  After all, 
the program merely divided the insured into two groups — “pregnant 
women and nonpregnant persons.”  “While the first group is exclusively 
 
 152.  See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that a state may 
deny all women opportunities to tend bar in light of moral and social problems). 
 153.  See CRITTENDEN, supra note 80. 
 154.   Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634 (1974). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.   Id. at 635.  One of the schools also required that the teacher assure them that she 
had child care which would not interfere with her school duties.  Id. at 650.  The compulsory 
leave policy was instituted in 1952, which raises some interesting questions about post-war 
economic and social pressures to conform to a domestic ideology that rejected the gains of 
women in the industrial labor force during World War II, and promoted the establishment of 
nuclear families with women firmly ensconced in their primary roles as wives and mothers, 
even if they did work outside the home as well.  For the climate of the 1950s, see generally 
EVANS, supra note 142, Chapter 11; see also BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 
(1963). 
 157.  Id. at 642. 
 158.  Id. at 648.  This is a due process analysis rather than an equal protection 
analysis.  Id. at 644. 
 159.  Id. at 651.  Justice Powell, who concurred in the result, stated that even though 
most teachers are women, the Court was not reaching the question of whether these are sex-
based classifications.  Id. at 653. 
 160.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 489 (1974). 
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female, the second includes members of both sexes.  The fiscal and 
actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.”161  
The Court then surprised observers with its follow-up Title VII case.  
Despite an authoritative interpretation of the law by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the Court decided that Congress did not intend 
any different result under the statute than the Court itself had reached using 
its own constitutional analysis.162  Unless a plaintiff could show that 
exclusion of pregnancy was a mere pretext for sex discrimination, the 
classifications were pregnant versus non-pregnant persons.163  The Court 
also disavowed any notion that employers must accommodate one sex 
more than the other just because of “their differing roles in ‘the scheme of 
human existence.’”164 
G.E. v. Gilbert mobilized the opposition.  In short order, California 
reversed itself to amend its own Fair Employment and Housing Act165 to 
require employers to provide female employees with an unpaid pregnancy 
disability leave of up to four months.166  Meanwhile, a broad-based national 
coalition swiftly secured the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Amendment (“PDA”) to Title VII, which altered the definition of “sex 
discrimination” in the statute to include pregnancy too.167  The consensus 
fell apart, however, when the California’s new statute came before the 
Court in California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra.168 
Pregnancy burdens women employees uniquely, making mere non-
discrimination or neutrality problematic.  Even feminist advocates have 
found it difficult to conceptualize the proper legal approach: How can it be 
neutrality or sameness, when only women become pregnant?  How can it 
be special treatment when the lessons of history demonstrate the traps of 
protection?169  Although all agreeing that the new California disability 
 
 161.  Id. at 496 n.20. 
 162.  General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134, 140 (1976). 
 163.  But see Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that 
employer’s policy of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from 
pregnancy leave, although neutral on its face, imposed a more substantial burden on women 
than men,  and therefore constituted an illegal employment practice in the absence of proof 
of a “business necessity” defense; also holding  that the sick leave pay claim had to be 
remanded). 
 164.  Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139. 
 165.  CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 12945(b)(2) (West 2000). 
 166.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275 (1987).  The State’s 
Fair Employment and Housing Commission also interpreted the law to mean that employers 
must reinstate women returning from pregnancy leave, unless the job was no longer 
available due to business necessity.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 277 (addition of subsection (k) to s. 701, definitional section of Title VII).  
For the campaign to amend Title VII, see Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 356 n.194. 
 168.  479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 169.  See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on 
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 168-72 (1992) (discussing 
the split among feminists about statutes like the Montana one in Miller-Wohl that treated 
pregnancy specially, and why she still thought the equality approach was best).  See also 
OREN - FOR CHRISTENSEN 4/12/2006  9:46 AM 
Summer 2006] HONOR THY MOTHER? 211 
leave provision should be upheld (unlike a Montana statute also being 
challenged),170 feminist ranks split over philosophy and tactics: In its amici 
(friend of court) briefs, the ACLU argued that the PDA was a strict formal 
equality guarantee that did not allow special treatment by virtue of 
pregnancy.  They concluded from Muller that biologically based different 
treatment had harmed women in the long run, confining them to a separate 
and lesser sphere of employment.  The ACLU also declined to support 
special treatment for pregnancy in the workplace as a kind of affirmative 
action measure.  This neutrality posture, however, did not mean that the 
PDA necessarily conflicted with or “preempted” the state law.  If the bank 
offered no disability leave to men, but favored women in this way, there 
would be a problem.  However, since men also benefited from the general 
disability policy, the two statutes could be reconciled.  In fact, the state law 
effectively challenged the stereotype that disability leave for women, even 
including for pregnancy, differed in its essentials from disability leave for 
men.171 
The National Organization for Women (“NOW”) made a different 
argument: taken together, the two statutes could be read as “imposing 
mutual and complementary obligations upon California employers to 
provide up to four months unpaid disability leave to all disabled 
employees.”  In that view, there was no necessary conflict, and therefore no 
preemption.  The net result was that the benefits were extended to both 
women and men, with all employees guaranteed disability leave.172  
Labor’s brief took still another position.  It justified special treatment in the 
form of maternity leaves because without that accommodation women’s 
procreative choices were burdened, while men were free to reproduce 
without paying any penalty in work force participation.  In other words, in 
 
Donna Lehnoff, Beyond Maternity Leave; America Needs a Family Policy, Legal Times, 
Oct. 27, 1986, at 11 (calling “legal approval of special treatment for women based on 
pregnancy and childbirth” “the top of a ‘slippery slope,’ the bottom of which is a system of 
law that permits or requires discrimination against women based on their perceived or real 
biological differences from men.”) (Donna Lehnoff is associate director for legal policy and 
programs at Women’s Legal Defense Fund). 
 170.  The Montana statute provided that employers must grant unpaid maternity 
disability leave even if they had no other leave policy at all.  See Miller-Wohl Co. Inc. v. 
Commr. of Labor & Indus., 479 U.S. 1050 (1987) (vacating and remanding 692 P.2d 1243, 
for consideration in light of Guerra).  The Montana Supreme Court reinstated its opinion 
upon remand, 744 P.2d 871 (Mont. 1987). 
 171.  California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, Brief of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the League of Women Voters of the U.S., the League of Women Voters of Cal., the 
National Women’s Political Caucus, and the Coal Employment Project, as Amici Curiae, 
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Mark Guerra, 1986 WL 728369 (April 4, 1986) (No. 85-
494). 
 172.  California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, Brief of the National Organization 
for Women, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Bar Ass’n, Women 
Lawyers Division, Washington Area Chapter; National Women’s Law Center; Women’s 
Law Project; and Women’s Legal Defense Fund in Support of Neither Party Amici Curiae 
1986 WL 728368 (Apr. 04, 1986) (No. 85-494). 
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other to prevent a particular form of sex discrimination, this affirmative 
program was necessary.  According to the labor brief, that did not 
transform the California law into the kind of protectionism long since 
disavowed by labor along with the rest of society.173 
A divided Court reflected the confusion inherent in the pregnancy 
debate: Three dissenters adamantly insisted that the plain language of the 
PDA requires that employers treat pregnant employees the same as anyone 
else, no worse, but also no better.174  Justice Scalia, on the other hand, was 
willing to uphold the state law, but only on the basis of other “plain 
language” in the civil rights statute that limits the preemptive effect of 
federal law.175  The majority of the Court pressed two alternative 
arguments, either of which they found sufficient.  The first was the “floor 
not a ceiling” interpretation, i.e., that the congressional purpose behind the 
PDA was to prohibit discrimination in the workplace against pregnant 
women, and not to ban preferential treatment for those employees.176  The 
PDA was a rejection of the majority position in Gilbert, and therefore was 
entirely consistent with the dissent in that case.  As Justice Brennan stated 
therein, “a realistic understanding of conditions found in today’s labor 
environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning 
disability policies.”177 
 
 173.  California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra,  Brief of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amici Curiae1985 WL 670262 (Oct. 
Term 1985) (No. 85-494). 
While initially skeptical, organized labor had embraced protectionism at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, in alliance with the social feminists.  See Kessler-Harris, supra note 131, 
at 201-05.  Feminist ranks, however, were split over this strategy, with the National 
Women’s Party, supporting the “blanket amendment” drafted by Alice Paul (the Equal 
Rights Amendment), even though reformers feared it would jeopardize the improvements in 
working conditions.  Id. at 207.  These tensions persisted into the middle of the twentieth 
century.  For example, the progressive United Auto Workers (UAW) had established a 
“Women’s Bureau” during WWII, that condemned the effects of sex-specific protective 
labor legislation as early as the 1950s, seeing such laws as excuses for discrimination 
against women workers.  UAW Women’s Bureau members even were among the founding 
members of N.O.W. in 1968.  However, they were forced to withdraw from that 
organization for two years before they could persuade their union to support the Equal 
Rights Amendment.  Sara Evans, supra note 142, at 230, 257-58, 277-78.  See also Alice 
Kessler-Harris, Protection for Women: Trade Unions and Labor Laws, in DOUBLE 
EXPOSURE: WOMEN’S HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HOME (Wendy 
Chavkin, M.D., ed., 1984). 
By the 1970s, the argument about protective labor legislation and sex discrimination 
was essentially moot, and the courts had declared that Title VII preempted the remaining 
sex specific laws.  See, e.g., Weeks v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 
1969); Rosenfeld v. So. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).  Thus, the older 
protectionism was removed as an issue between labor and the women’s movement. 
 174.  California Fed. Sav. & L., 479 U.S. at 297 (White, J., dissenting ). 
 175.  Id. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment only). 
 176.  Id. at 284-86. 
 177.   Id. at 289 (citing G.E. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added)).  See also Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 n.17 (1973) 
(acknowledging that the PDA incorporated the position of the dissent in Gilbert). 
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In an alternative holding (or perhaps dicta), the Court also seemingly 
adopted the NOW position: Even if preferential policies were not 
permitted, the PDA still did not preempt California’s law.178  The state did 
not compel employers to treat women workers better than men.  Rather, it 
established the standard for pregnancy disability leaves.  Employers were 
free to match that with comparable disability benefits for all, thus 
simultaneously satisfying the state and the federal statutes.  Without any 
necessary conflict between the mandates of the two laws, there also would 
be no preemption by the PDA.179 
The same women’s, civil rights, and labor interests that supported the 
result in Guerra, quickly united in a major legislative campaign to finesse 
the pregnancy and special treatment conundrum, through a gender neutral 
solution called the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  Introduced 
in April of 1986, the proposal “sped through hearings” in the House, where 
it garnered more than 100 co-sponsors.  As Donna Lenhoff, Associate 
Director of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, explained, the proposal was 
intended to be “a significant first step toward a national policy to encourage 
the accommodation of workplaces to employees’ family 
responsibilities.”180  Since women bore the brunt of that burden in most 
families, they had the most to lose from the absence of such 
accommodations, and the most to gain from a new approach.181  Despite the 
broad-based support, however, the FMLA was not enacted until 1993.182  
The legislation was passed by Congress twice, only to be vetoed by the first 
President Bush.183  With the election of President William J. Clinton (in 
part based on a noted “gender gap” in voting patterns),184 however, the 
threat of veto was removed, and the FMLA of 1993 passed.185  It requires 
 
 178.  Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 479 U.S. at 290-92. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Lehnoff, supra note 169.  The FMLA was originally introduced in Congress in 
1985 by Patricia Schroeder.  See, Judith Elder, Pregnant in the Marketplace: Legal Rights of 
Pregnant Women, Mothers and Fathers,” Mothering, Sept. 22, 1989, 53 at 86. 
 181.  Lenhoff, supra note 169. 
 182.  In 1988 a different version of the bill died when supporters could not break an 
“election-eve” filibuster; the legislation was reintroduced in 1989 with the support of 130 
House co-sponsors; and 150 national children’s family, health, labor and business groups.  
Tamara Henry, Family leave bill reintroduced, United Press International Feb. 2, 1989.  
Among the major industrialized nations at the time, only the United States and South Africa 
lacked nationally mandated maternity-leave benefits.  France, Canada, West Germany, Italy 
and Japan, all mandated paid parental or maternity leave at 60 percent to 100 percent normal 
salary.  Andrea Herman, ABA Backs Parental Leave Bill, 75 A.B.J. 123 (1989). 
 183.  Michelle Ruess, Family-Leave Details Uncertain for ‘93, Plain Dealer, Nov. 28, 
1992 at 4a.  In an election speech in 1992, Bush said that he believed it would lead to 
discrimination against women; Bush and Family Leave: Makes Pitch to Working Women, 
The Hotline, Sept. 21, 1992. 
 184.  See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Women’s Day, 1992 Election, 255 THE NATION 17, 17 
(Nov. 1992) (celebrating the 11 point gender gap in voting in favor of Bill Clinton, and the 
accession of four new women Senators and a near doubling of female Representatives). 
 185.  After the second election of George W. Bush,, however, new threats to the 
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covered employers to give all employees up to 12 weeks unpaid leave after 
the birth or adoption of a child, or for their own or a family member’s 
(spouse, child, parent) serious health condition.186 
The neutrality approach of the FMLA was subsequently upheld in 
Nevada v. Hibbs187 by a divided Supreme Court as an exercise of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in order to 
prevent discrimination on the grounds of sex.  Interestingly, Justice 
Rehnquist, who has never been happy with heightened judicial scrutiny for 
sex based classifications,188 nonetheless wrote an opinion for the majority 
relying on that framework.189  He cited the findings of Congress that 
“[h]istorically, denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities 
has been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are 
mothers first, and workers second.  This prevailing ideology about 
women’s roles has in turn justified discrimination against women when 
they are mothers or mothers-to-be.”190  Conversely, Congress found that 
stereotypes about men’s “lack of domestic responsibilities” help close the 
“self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced stereotypical views about 
women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”  By virtue of 
its neutrality, the statutory remedy attacked both unfortunate stereotypes: 
since all employees enjoyed the benefit, employers could no longer single 
out women as “an inordinate drain on the workplace,” that can be avoided 
by hiring only men.191 
By contrast to the Phillips Title VII result, the FMLA incorporates a 
 
FMLA have emerged.  The United States Chamber of Commerce wants significant revisions 
in light of what it insists is havoc in the workplace.  See Bradford Plumer, Business Groups 
are trying to restrict the Family and Medical Leave Act. That’s precisely the wrong 
approach, MOTHER JONES, June 7, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/ 
commentary/columns/2005/06/FMLA.html.  Meanwhile, proponents seek expansion of 
FMLA provisions, either through collective bargaining or revisions in the law. 
 186.  Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2005).  In the 18 
months between 1999-2000, nearly 24 million Americans took leave for FMLA covered 
reasons.  Employees often had to resort to unpaid FMLA leave because their employers do 
not offer sick leave or disability pay.  See Stephanie Armour, Family Medical Leave Act at 
Center of Hot Debate, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005, at 1B. 
 187.  Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 188.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (questioning the appropriateness of the “substantially motivated by an important 
governmental purpose” intermediate standard for gender-based classifications). 
 189.  Hibbs, 538 U.S at 724.  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissented.  Id. at 
743 (Scalia, J., dissenting), & at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 190.  Id. at 736.  The appeal to the history of sex discrimination was pursued in an 
amicus brief by a virtual honor roll of  women’s historians.  See, Brief for Women’s History 
Scholars Alice Kessler, Harris, Linda Kerber, et al. Supporting Respondents, Nevada           
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (No. 01-1368).  The amici demonstrated a long history          
of gender stereotyping that “family care is primarily women’s work and is women’s primary 
responsibility” and of intentional discrimination by the state in leave policies for its          
own employees and in legislation that restricted women’s employment opportunities.  Id. at 
pp. 1-2. 
 191.  Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736-37. 
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different kind of neutrality.  It provides an affirmative remedy that does not 
single women out and thus in theory does not penalize them for their 
greater caring responsibilities.  In the absence of a cultural change that 
would encourage men to utilize the FMLA in significant numbers, 
however, women still will bear the brunt of the disruptions in work force 
participation along with the resulting economic penalties. 
The same concern about lopsided incentives that fueled the FMLA 
proposal, and an additional fear of spillover effects on health and safety in 
the workplace, had already sparked a campaign by women’s and labor 
organizations in opposition to corporate “fetal protection” exclusionary 
policies.192  In the late 1970s, lead and chemical companies, which had 
recently come under pressure to open higher-paid jobs on the shop floor to 
women, suddenly discovered a concern for the potential fetuses of their 
female employees.  They promulgated policies that banned all women who 
could not demonstrate that they were surgically sterile from working in 
departments where they would be exposed to lead or other dangerous 
substances.193  One of the five women who agreed to sterilization in order 
to retain higher-paying jobs at American Cyanamid’s Willow Island plant 
later said “[b]ut I don’t think it’s right that a company can tell you to do a 
thing like this to keep your job.  I did it because I was scared and I had to 
have the income.”194 
 Having failed in initial efforts to use OSHA law or joint agency 
regulations to address the problem,195 the coalition turned to Title VII and 
sex discrimination law.  Ultimately, the issue came before the Supreme 
Court in a case called UAW v. Johnson Controls.196  The result was a 
significant victory for neutrality principles, as a bulwark against both sex 
discrimination and degradation of the work environment.  The Court ruled 
that the exclusionary policies were not justified because the safety of third 
persons, i.e. the potential fetuses, did not constitute a BFOQ sufficient to 
excuse policies that were based on sex discrimination on their face.  There 
was no BFOQ because the ability to become pregnant has nothing to do 
with an employee’s ability to perform the essence of the job.197  Therefore, 
Justice Blackmun opined, the woman herself must decide the relative 
importance of her economic and reproductive roles, and therefore what 
risks she is willing to take in the workplace.198 
 
 192.  See Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 351 (discussing establishment of the 
Coalition for Reproductive Rights of Workers (CRROW) after story of coerced 
sterilizations to keep jobs at American Cyanamid’s Willow Island Plant broke). 
 193.  Id. at 340-42. 
 194.   Id. at 349 (citing  Bill Richards, “Women Say They Had to be Sterilized to Hold 
Jobs,” WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1979, at A1). 
 195.  Id. at 352-62. 
 196.  499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 197.   Id. at 206. 
 198.   Id. 
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 Some critics decried the result in Johnson Controls as an ironic 
instance of women winning the right to work in an equally dangerous 
workplace as men.199  Whatever the practical results may have been, 
especially in an increasingly conservative political and regulatory climate 
after the 1980s, the decision was necessary, both for sex discrimination and 
for occupational health and safety law.  Without it, the BFOQ defense to 
sex discrimination in Title VII would have been diluted beyond a narrow 
focus on a quality that cut to the essence of the business, such as wet-
nursing.  Such a ruling would have reopened an enormous gap in civil 
rights protection against discriminatory treatment of women in the work 
place in the name of protection of their capacity for motherhood.  
Furthermore, the labor agenda of changing the workplace, not the 
worker,200 also would be compromised.  Instead of adhering to stricter lead 
standards and environmental controls, companies could simply remove 
those workers they claimed to be more vulnerable,201 and let poor working 
conditions ride.  Understood properly, through a double lens of sex and 
class, even if it did not guarantee success, the Johnson Controls neutrality 
decision was critical to progress on either front.202 
From Muller v. Oregon in 1908 to Nevada v. Hibbs in 2003, the story 
of motherhood in the work place reads like “progress” toward neutrality 
and the acknowledgement of the value of women workers.203  In today’s 
world, moms clearly are in the work force to stay.  In 2002, about three-
fifths of women were paid wage-earners.  This included 72 percent of 
women with children under 18, and 61 percent of women with children 
under the age of 3.204  It is legally unacceptable to exclude women workers 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Ruth Rosen, What Feminist Victory in the Court? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 1991, at A17.  See also, Linda Greenhouse, “Court Backs Right of Women to Jobs With 
Health Risks,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A1, B12. 
 200.  See Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 346-47 (citing, “Informal Public 
Hearing on Proposed Standard for Exposure to Lead, United States Department of Labor, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration,” Mar. 16, 1977, at 679 [Lead Standard 
Hearings] at 1144 (testimony of Olga Madar). 
 201.  The companies seemed unconcerned about the reproductive vulnerabilities of 
male workers, and even male union officials had to be persuaded to think outside of the 
fetus-equals-motherhood box and to consider the role of men in reproduction.  See, Oren, 
Protection, supra note 145, at 345. 
 202.  But see Elaine Draper, Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies 
After Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 117, 120-25 (2001) (arguing that 
corporate exclusion policies changed less after the Supreme Court’s decision than would be 
expected). 
 203.  See, e.g., Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 636 (“mother’s insurance benefits” for 
surviving wives of insured men, but none for surviving husbands of deceased women 
workers who were raising children, violated equal protection); Califano, 443 U.S. at 76 
(state law permitting AFDC payments to dependent children whose fathers were 
unemployed, but denying those benefits if their mothers were unemployed is 
unconstitutional). 
 204.  Women at Work: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Oct. 2003, at 45, 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/10/ressum3.pdf. 
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because they are mothers, or have the capacity to become mothers.  That 
certainly is a positive development.  The Court, however, has not said that 
it requires an accommodation to women’s “differing roles in the scheme of 
human existence.”205  For example, it upheld a Missouri statute which 
even-handedly excluded from unemployment benefits all claimants who 
“voluntarily” leave their jobs “for a reason not causally connected to their 
work,” including pregnancy.206  Neutrality alone, moreover, cannot provide 
a true social solution for women who wish to combine motherhood with 
employment.  We are still left largely to our own devices.  FMLA leave is 
unpaid,207 and it is unlikely that women workers, who are typically lower 
paid than men,208 will stay in the workforce while fathers stay home.  
Unlike in other western industrialized countries, there is no corporate 
crèche system or tax-supported quality day care that shifts some of the 
burden to society as a whole instead of resting it on individual families.209  
 
 205.  Cf. G.E. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 (pre-PDA ruling that Title VII does not 
require employers to accommodate a pregnant worker and that the classification was not 
gender-based).  But see Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (post-PDA case 
permitting state to require maternity leave policies without finding pre-emption by Title 
VII).  For a similar debate over New Jersey’s anti-discrimination statute, see Gerety v. 
Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 877 A.2d 1233 (N.J. 2005) (upholding 26-
week disability policy even though it did not cover the full term of a pregnancy related 
disability).  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that even though “it goes without saying 
that only women get pregnant” and that discrimination because of pregnancy is unlawful, no 
special accommodation is required, so long as there is any uniquely male disability that 
potentially lasts more than 26 weeks and also would not be fully covered.  Id. at 403-04. 
 206.  Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm’n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511, 512 
(1987). 
 207.  Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2005).  Even in its 
current form, the FMLA is under attack.  See Congresswoman Tubbs Jones Signs Letter 
Urging Bush Administration Against Changes to Family Medical Leave Act, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Apr. 4, 2005 (Tubbs and other Democrats sent letter to Department of Labor which is 
currently considering proposals to roll back many of the protections of the FMLA, by 
changing the definition of a “serious health condition” and restricting the use of intermittent 
leave to care for a family member.)  Congresswoman Tubbs is also an original co-sponsor of 
a bill to extend coverage of the FMLA to more categories of family members. 
Critics have stated that 45 percent of American workers are not covered by family 
leave laws.  More than half of workers who need leave do not take it because they cannot 
afford it.  Only 2 percent of private sector employees are eligible for paid family leave.  
Meanwhile, more and more mothers of young children are in the workforce, and 
responsibilities for older family members are growing.  Steve Idemoto, Family Leave 
Insurance: A Proposal for Washington Workers, http://www.econop.org/FLI-
PolicyBrief2000-IntroContextProblem.htm#Context (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). 
208.  Although there were significant variations by age and racial category, median 
weekly earnings for full time U.S. women workers in 2003 were 80 percent of men’s, up 
from 78 percent in 2002, and from 63 percent in 1979.  HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
IN 2003, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR STATISTICS 2004, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom 
2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).  Serious occupational segregation, which contribute to 
earnings disparities, persists. 
 209.  See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall 
Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 379 (2004), (citing Janet C. Gornick & Marcia K. Meyers, 
Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment (2004) 
(describing policy differences between Europe and the U.S.).  “France, for example, makes 
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Moreover, employment decisions can never be “neutral” in the absence of a 
universal health care system.210  The extraordinary growth of women’s 
employment has taken place predominantly in the service sector that is 
notorious for its lack of benefits.211  Again, this makes it more likely that 
women have a tenuous hold on the workforce, especially when they 
become mothers.  On top of these considerations, employers, and perhaps 
families themselves, have to be convinced that it is as legitimate for a 
father to require accommodation of his family role as it is for a mother.212 
 
one-stop education, medical care, and psychiatric care available through a subsidized system 
of neighborhood child care centers.  These programs are viewed as so important for 
children’s social development that parents fight to get their children into them.”  Joan C. 
Williams & Shauna L. Shames, Mothers’ Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of 
Motherhood, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 818, 829 (2004).  See also Harry Gee, New Paradigms of 
Criminal Justice for the Twenty-First Century, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 55 (2000) (citing 
Elliott Currie, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1998) at 158 (describing how child care 
for 3- to 5-year-olds is nearly universal in Europe; and Sweden has subsidized pre-school 
day care at child care centers). 
 210.  Although European social health programs have undergone some recent 
changes, they still remain cornerstones of the welfare state.  See, e.g., Hans Maarse, Aggie 
Paulus, Has Solidarity Survived?  A Comparative Analysis of the Effect of Social Health 
Insurance Reform in Four European Countries, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 585 (2003); 
Robert F. Rich, Health Policy, Health Insurance And The Social Contract, 21 COMP. LAB. 
L. & POL’Y J. 397 (2000). 
 211.  Bill Moyers, Politics and Economy, Downward Mobility; Questions and 
Answers with Beth Shulman, Oct. 24, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics /wagesqanda. 
html (stating that the largest projected growth in the United States economy over the next 
ten year is in low wage industries where women predominate and that women often accept 
sacrifices in wages and benefits in order to gain flexibility to fulfill family responsibilities).  
Shulman is the author of THE BETRAYAL OF WORK: HOW LOW-WAGE JOBS FAIL 30 MILLION 
AMERICANS.  See also Jay M. Berman, Industry Output & Employment Projections to 2012, 
127 MONTHLY. LAB. REV. 58 (2004) (predicting that almost all the projected growth through 
2012 will be in the service economy). 
 212.  As the daughter of a mother who needs care, I recognize that stereotyped 
expectations are deeply embedded in all our family relationships (including my own) and 
are practically unavoidable.  If you want to see the doctor, you must be available at all 
hours, on their schedule.  If you have an elderly mother who cannot reliably report her 
history, what choice is there but to accede?  If you want to avoid the inevitable mishaps of 
communication and care of a seriously ill individual that occur with each change of shift or 
change of facility, you must be personally present to protect someone who is unable to 
defend herself.  It is an unusual son indeed who takes personal responsibility; and an elderly 
mother even may prefer help from her daughter.  As my mother says, “thank god for a 
daughter.”  When I say, “you could rent one,” teasingly, she says seriously, “no, no one 
would do this except a daughter,” and there are times that she only responds to the comfort 
of her daughter.  I can read to her or talk about family and sometimes break the cycle of 
preoccupation with physical suffering that has her begging for someone to help.  Am I 
supposed to turn my back on that?  What kind of institutionalized social support is there 
when one is 60, working full-time, and taking care of an elderly mother (and has 
responsibilities for other family members)?  Section 661.201 of the Texas Government 
Code provides for accumulated paid sick leave, but it may only be used to care for someone 
who both resides in the same household and is related by kinship, adoption, marriage, or is 
in foster care.  An employee’s use of sick leave for family members who do not live in the 
household “is strictly limited to the time necessary to provide care and assistance to a 
spouse, child, or parent of the employee who needs such assistance as a direct result of a 
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While some mothers are presumed to care, and others apparently must 
be coerced to care satisfactorily, working mothers are welcome to remain 
in the workforce, but only so long as they keep their caring from interfering 
too much. 
IV.  NON-MOTHERHOOD: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE OR 
CHOOSE TO BE A MOTHER 
The abortion cases constitute the last aspect of “motherhood” 
contemplated by the Supreme Court.  In the late 1960s, feminists active in 
women’s liberation groups identified the personal as political and began to 
demand the right to refuse the significant physical risks and personal 
consequences of carrying a pregnancy to term.  In 1969, for example, a 
radical feminist group called the Redstockings stormed legislative hearings 
considering abortion law reform proposals in New York State.213  The 
hearings had scheduled testimony from 14 male professionals and one nun.  
Excluded from the hearings, the Redstockings held their own public 
proceedings, claiming, “We are the experts, the only experts, we who’ve 
had abortions.”  After this speak-out, attorneys Florynce Kennedy and 
Diane Schulder, supported by a coalition of women’s liberation 
organizations, brought a federal case challenging New York’s existing 
laws, and prepared to put on what they called “the women’s case” in 
addition to the “doctors’ case” and the “experts’ case.”214  The lawsuit was 
declared moot after the New York legislature passed the nation’s first 
reformed abortion law, which went into effect July 1, 1970.215  That timid 
measure, however, did not satisfy the likes of Kennedy and Schulder, who 
saw the abortion issue “as the vanguard of attack against the oppressive 
police and government actions, for a declaration of women’s rights to 
control their own bodies and destinies.”216  The activist attorneys were also 
well aware of the economic barriers to women’s health, and the racism that 
 
documented medical condition.  For the purpose of this policy, parent does not cover 
parents-in-law of the employee.”  University of Houston, Vacation and Sick Leave (Oct. 8, 
2004), http://www.uhsa.uh.edu/sam/AM/Am_02d01.htm. 
 213.  DIANA SCHULDER & FLORYNCE KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP: TESTIMONY BY 
WOMEN WHO HAVE SUFFERED THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS 3-4 
(1971). 
 214.  The case was styled Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, (consolidated with three other 
cases).  Id. at 91-95.  The litigation planning was coordinated with women’s liberation 
activists, including the Women’s Health Collective; the Women’s Abortion Project and 
other members of a coalition.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 178.  The statute still outlawed abortions after 24 weeks of pregnancy, 
unless they were necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman.  Id.  After enactment 
of the law, from mid-1970 through 1972, nearly 350,000 women left their home states to get 
safe and legal abortions in New York.  SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 15 
(1992). 
 216.  SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 213, at 186. 
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characterized some components of the abortion rights movement.217 
Meanwhile, in Austin, Texas, Sarah Weddington joined a group at the 
University of Texas interested in women’s health issues,218 that later began 
to make abortion referrals.219  The members were concerned about their 
legal position, leading Weddington to file the famous Roe v. Wade lawsuit 
in 1970 when she was a young lawyer.220  Since 1973, when Roe’s 
somewhat startling victory was pronounced, the course of the right to 
refuse to be a mother has not run smoothly, either in Court, or in the streets.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all the ins and outs of the 
vast body of abortion jurisprudence.  But it is worth looking at a few 
critical cases to see what the Court had to say specifically about 
motherhood and its physical and social implications.  In Roe v. Wade,221 for 
example, the anonymous Norma McCorvey alleged “that she was 
unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an 
abortion ‘performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, 
clinical conditions’; that she was unable to get a ‘legal’ abortion in Texas 
because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her 
pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in 
order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions.”222 
The case, and the abortion controversy that persists until today, focused 
in part on the history of abortion in the common law, and the philosophy of 
the derivation of constitutionally protected interests such as “the right to 
privacy.”  Justice Blackmun’s opinion, however, also has something to say 
about the physical and social consequences of motherhood.  He wrote that 
motherhood by virtue of a state law that denied choice could involve  
“[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early 
pregnancy.”223 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
 
 217.  Id. at 153-61.  The Right to Choose coalition in Rochester New York in the 
years immediately preceding the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade included the 
local chapter of Zero Population Growth.  ZPG later became associated nationally with a 
right-wing anti-immigrant platform. 
 218.  The Austin self-help group was inspired by the now-classic OUR BODIES 
OURSELVES, which the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective published and which sold 
a phenomenal 200,000 copies in a newsprint edition put out by a nonprofit press in 1971, 
before being published by a commercial press in 1973.  Between 1971 and 1976 it sold 
more than 850,000 copies.  CSAH, An Outline of American History, 
http://www.americanhistory.or.kr/book/files/etwelve06.html#1212, (2002). 
 219.  WEDDINGTON, supra note 215, at 28–34. 
 220.  Id. at 44-56.  Norma McCorvey, who was the anonymous plaintiff “Roe,” 
subsequently became an anti-choice activist.  In February of 2005, her effort to have the 
Supreme Court reopen the case named for her was rejected. Supreme Court declines to 
reopen abortion decision, McCorvey v. Hill, No. 04-967 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005), HOSPITAL 
LITIGATION RPTR., Mar. 2005, at p.5. 
 221.   410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 222.  Id. at 120. 
 223.  Id. at 153. 
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distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.  
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily 
will consider in consultation.224 
On its part, the State possessed important interests in safeguarding the 
health of the pregnant woman “in maintaining medical standards, and in 
protecting potential life.”225  In other words, women had their interest in 
making choices about a condition with potentially serious physical and 
social sequellae.  The State had its interest in regulating those choices up to 
a point.  The trimester approach of Roe, since repudiated by the Supreme 
Court, gave more weight to the State’s interest in protecting maternal 
health in the second trimester; and only allowed its interest in potential life 
to trump the woman’s choices in the last trimester of pregnancy.226 
Justice Blackmun’s framework came under attack and finally fell apart 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.227  In a 
decision notable for its length and dueling opinions, Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter held the balance of power that prevented a total 
debacle for the right to refuse to continue a pregnancy.228  While rejecting 
the trimester approach as unworkable, the joint opinion acknowledged that 
women enjoy a liberty interest in the decision to terminate a pregnancy.229  
The Justices saw abortion as a unique act “fraught with consequences” for 
all concerned, including the woman “who must live with the implications 
of her decision.”  The State, however, had a limited ability to regulate the 
conduct “because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to 
the human condition and so unique to the law.” 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to 
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.  That these sacrifices 
have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a 
pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond 
of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the 
sacrifice.  Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, 
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant 
 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 154. 
 226.  Id. at 163-64. 
 227.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 228.  Id. at 843-44 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., announcing the judgment of 
the Court, and delivering an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, and an 
opinion with respect to Part V-E, in which Justice Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect 
to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D). 
 229.  Id. at 852 (Joint Opinion). 
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that vision has been in the course of our history and culture.  The destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her 
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.230 
The State’s interests, however, were not insubstantial, and the Casey 
swing opinion drew the line at a new place called “viability.”  Pre-viability, 
the State could enact all kinds of regulations, so long as they did not have 
the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden” on the woman’s 
autonomous choice.231  Post-viability, the State’s interest in protecting 
potential life could actually prevail over the woman’s interests, unless there 
was a threat to her life or health.232 
Interestingly, the new conservative-moderate team of Justices balked at 
Pennsylvania’s laws of spousal notification.  The Court was very impressed 
 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. at 877-78. 
 232.  Id. at 879.  The landscape of abortion jurisprudence changed with Casey, with 
many more regulations passing muster.  See Brent Weinstein, The State’s Constitutional 
Power to Regulate Abortion, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 229 (2004); Lisa Shaw Roy, 
Roe and the New Frontier, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339 (2003). 
The Allan Guttmacher Institute tracks legislation introduced in all the states and by 
Congress.  The restrictions it reports include the following: mandatory counseling and 
waiting periods for abortion in at least 22 states (found at http://www.guttmacher.org 
/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWRA.pdf.); 32 states which require some parental involvement in 
a minor’s decision to have an abortion (http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ 
spib_PIMA.pdf); 46 states which require hospitals, facilities and physicians providing 
abortions to submit regular and confidential reports to the state (http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
statecenter/spibs/spib_ARR.pdf).  A variety of “conscience clauses” permit health care 
providers in 46 states to refuse to provide abortion services; in 12 states providers may 
refuse contraceptive services too; and in 17 states they may decline to provide sterilization 
services.  The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Refusing To Provide Health 
Services 1 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf. 
The sad necessity for post-viability abortions inspired heated controversy over what 
has inaccurately been called the “partial-birth” abortion technique.  The Supreme Court 
invalidated a Nebraska law because it lacked an exception for preserving the pregnant 
woman’s health.  See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  However, many other such 
bans, with varying conditions which may or may not be constitutional, remain on the books.  
See The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Bans On Partial-Birth Abortion (Feb. 
1, 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf.  There are 5 states 
with a post-viability ban, but the two of them which lack a health exception are 
unenforceable in light of Stenberg.  Of four states with a health exception, two are broad and 
two are very narrow.  Nineteen states and the District of Columbia limit post-viability 
abortions, but include the health exception required by Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The 
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Restrictions on Postviability Abortions (Feb. 1, 
2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPA. 
Congress has passed a federal ban on partial birth abortions (also with no health 
exception) (the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2005)), which the 
Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional in July of 2005.  See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 
(8th Cir. 2005).  Certiorari has been granted by the United States Supreme Court, Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 2006 WL 385614 (2006), which will hear it in its reconfigured shape.  The late 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor have been 
replaced by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, respectively.  
Justice O’Connor provided a critical swing vote on abortion cases, while Justice Alito is 
widely feared to have a much less open mind. 
OREN - FOR CHRISTENSEN 4/12/2006  9:46 AM 
Summer 2006] HONOR THY MOTHER? 223 
with the evidence of serious domestic violence in families, and wished to 
repudiate an outdated gender-determined view of the proper roles in homes 
and families.  It cited everything from Bradwell v. State, in which a married 
woman was unable to gain admission to the state bar of Illinois, to other 
decisions insisting “woman is still regarded as the center of home and 
family life, with attendant ‘special responsibilities that precluded full and 
independent legal status under the Constitution.’”233  But this common law 
notion of a “woman’s role within the family” was no longer acceptable, and 
consequently a husband had no right to interfere in his wife’s exercise of 
her constitutionally protected liberty interest.234 
Contrast to the above, Justice Blackmun’s impassioned defense of his 
original decision.235  His argument was more explicit in dissent in Casey 
than it had been in the original Roe opinion, about what was at stake for 
women if they lost the right to refuse to continue a pregnancy.  The risks 
included infringement “upon a woman’s right to bodily integrity by 
imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical 
harm.  During pregnancy, women experience dramatic physical changes 
and a wide range of health consequences.  Labor and delivery pose 
additional health risks and physical demands.”236  In other words, 
continuation of pregnancy meant serious intrusion on the bodily integrity of 
the woman.  The woman denied the right to refuse also lost the ability to 
make her own autonomous decisions about reproduction and family 
planning — “critical life choices that that Court long has deemed central to 
the right to privacy.”237  Motherhood affects “woman’s educational 
prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination,” so to deny 
her choice in this sphere is to “deprive her of basic control over her life.”238  
Moreover, forced motherhood has gender implications: “The State 
conscripts women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their 
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide 
years of maternal care, “all without compensation from the State for their 
services.  Instead, the dissent continued, it is assumed that motherhood is 
“natural” for women.239  Justice Blackmun also questioned the bona fides 
of the asserted State interest in “maternal health,” which it seemed to him 
to focus only on making women feel maternal.240 
Motherhood as risk and burden justified a woman’s claim to make her 
own decisions whether to be or not to be a mother.  The state’s interest in 
 
 233.  Id. at 897. 
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 235.  Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 236.   Id. at 927. 
 237.  Id. 
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 240.  Id. at 941. 
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compelling the completion of the pregnancy, by contrast, focused on the 
fetus, on the “potential life” that would be snuffed out by the woman’s 
choice not to be a mother.  A funny thing happened on the way to the 
Court’s abortion decisions.  The Women’s Liberation demand for 
promotion of women’s health seems to have taken a back seat, except as a 
paradoxical justification to impose deliberately discouraging restrictions on 
women’s choices.  Thus, when it came to coverage by public programs for 
safe, healthy abortions for indigent women, the Court simply was not 
interested.  First, it ruled that Medicaid had no obligation to finance non-
therapeutic abortions for indigent women, even though it did provide 
benefits for childbirth.241  Then it upheld a very restrictive version of the 
Hyde Amendment, in which Congress prohibited the use of any federal 
funds to reimburse the cost of even medically-indicated abortions under the 
joint federal/state Medicaid program, except for very narrow 
circumstances.242  Both of these decisions were based on the jurisprudential 
position that while government may not actively prohibit choices, it has no 
obligation to affirmatively support them.  In other words, the interest of a 
poor woman wishing to protect her health during an unwanted pregnancy is 
not of equal constitutional weight with her theoretical “freedom of choice.”  
She was poor before she got pregnant; she remains poor; and, if the public 
authorities prefer to spend their money on childbirth rather than abortions, 
she is left to her own devices.  This strict “you’re on your own” approach 
extended not just to elective non-therapeutic abortions, but even to those 
that were “medically necessary” (so long as the woman’s life itself was not 
at risk).243 
There are many reasons that the abortion finance cases were decided as 
they were, but they also demonstrate the limits of the Court’s views of 
motherhood.  Majorities on the Court admitted that motherhood that was 
not freely chosen was an enormous imposition on the physical integrity and 
life opportunities of the women who were deprived of the ability to choose 
or refuse.  They also acknowledged that poverty could deprive women of 
their choices as effectively as any state law did.  But the support for healthy 
motherhood, or healthy non-motherhood, is as absent from the Court’s 
decisions as it often is in public policy.  While the state may “favor” 
childbirth with its policies, it is not required by virtue of the Constitution to 
 
 241.   Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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provide resources to support healthful autonomous choices about 
motherhood. 
V.  CONCLUSION: HONOR THY MOTHER? 
The Court’s views about “motherhood” must be teased out from 
holdings in four apparently disconnected areas and from decisions that may 
be oblique or obscure.  Worse still, the Court relies on generic assumptions 
that fail to reflect how complicated an undertaking it is to be a mother in 
this society, and how much that experience is shaped by all facets of a 
woman’s life, including her age, her class, her race, her marital status and 
familial resources, and the expectations of others and of herself.  Despite 
some decided improvements, like the FMLA, and in the face of the pro-
family and pro-marriage rhetoric of the Bush administration, there is in fact 
very little social support either for motherhood, or for its complement, 
refusing motherhood. 
When compared to unmarried fathers, biology is destiny for mothers, 
who are presumed to be “caring” in a way that fathers have to establish by 
“stepping forward.”  But for those mothers who become dependent on the 
largesse of the state, the presumption shifts: it is no longer acceptable for 
them to be paid to stay at home and raise children.  Rather, they are objects 
of suspicion and coercion who must be pushed into the labor force in short 
order.  Working mothers, on the other hand, are respectable.  They earn this 
status, however, largely insofar as they can conform to a neutral role in the 
workplace.  The Court was not even willing to recognize pregnancy 
discrimination in employment as a species of illegal treatment on the 
grounds of sex until it was reversed by Congress in the PDA.  The Court 
approved California’s maternity leave policy, but subsequent gender 
neutral federal legislation mooted that divisive opinion.  It has never clearly 
ruled that accommodations may be necessary in order for women to 
participate in the normal scheme of workplace activities.  Finally, in its 
abortion decisions, the Court has significantly retreated from its pioneering 
Roe v. Wade decision about the right to refuse to become a mother.  Indeed, 
with the retirement of Justice O’Connor who so often provided a critical 
swing vote and her replacement by Justice Samuel Alito, women’s liberties 
in this area hang by a thread.  In any case, the abortion rights cases never 
included a real dedication to the promotion of women’s health, either as 
mothers or as non-mothers, respectively.  Indigent women are on their own 
in procuring the resources necessary to make a safe decision. 
When Shulamith Firestone first published “The Dialectic of Sex” in 
1970, she offered a shocking argument: Just as the struggle over the means 
of production was the key to class inequality, women must seize control 
over the means of reproduction if they wanted to be free of sex 
discrimination.  This included the potential for entirely artificial 
reproduction whereby children would not have to be produced in the 
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physical wombs of their biological mothers, or of any other woman.  
Firestone argued that only in this way would female dependence on males 
be avoided and “the tyranny of the biological family . . . be broken,” along 
with the “psychology of power.”  She warned, however, that the “new 
technology, especially fertility control, may be used against them to 
reinforce the entrenched system of exploitation.” 
Firestone’s Orwellian vision has come true in part, as there is a new 
technology that separates the biology of fertilization and genetics entirely 
from gestation in a particular womb mother’s body.  However, it does not 
remove the necessity of pregnancy or really change the experience of 
motherhood for most women.  Even if women wished to be, they are not 
“free” of the “tyranny of the biological family.”  More importantly, they 
are not free of the tyranny of the social attitudes and stereotypes that under 
gird the Supreme Court’s views on “motherhood.”  The Court has 
constructed “Motherhood” with a capital “M,” but without Honor.  It 
remains enormously difficult to be a mother in our society.  Ask any 
mother who has no choice about doing most of the caring; ask any 
dependent mother who has to swallow the insults of the State in order to 
feed her children; ask any working mother who is underpaid and who has 
to pretend not to be a mother in order to succeed in the workplace, or, 
alternatively, has to compromise her working life; ask any woman who is 
subjected to harassment by society instead of support for her choices in 
making a healthy abortion decision.  The current political and legal 
environment makes it hard to believe in the potential for radical change, so 
let us at least get back to basics: “Honor Thy Mother.”  Honor the right of 
every woman to be an autonomous, self-directing, healthy individual who 
enjoys physical and social support for choosing a very valuable role, or for 
refusing it safely and with dignity and respect. 
 
